Amazon.com Widgets

Thursday, July 13, 2006

Yossi Klein Halevi makes some good points here, at TNR: Battle Plans

The next Middle East war--Israel against genocidal Islamism--has begun. The first stage of the war started two weeks ago, with the Israeli incursion into Gaza in response to the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier and the ongoing shelling of Israeli towns and kibbutzim; now, with Hezbollah's latest attack, the war has spread to southern Lebanon. Ultimately, though, Israel's antagonists won't be Hamas and Hezbollah but their patrons, Iran and Syria. The war will go on for months, perhaps several years. There may be lulls in the fighting, perhaps even temporary agreements and prisoner exchanges. But those periods of calm will be mere respites.

The goals of the war should be the destruction of the Hamas regime and the dismantling of the Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon. Israel cannot coexist with Iranian proxies pressing in on its borders. In particular, allowing Hamas to remain in power--and to run the Palestinian educational system--will mean the end of hopes for Arab-Israeli reconciliation not only in this generation but in the next one too.

For the Israeli right, this is the moment of "We told you so." The fact that the kidnappings and missile attacks have come from southern Lebanon and Gaza--precisely the areas from which Israel has unilaterally withdrawn--is proof, for right-wingers, of the bankruptcy of unilateralism. Yet the right has always misunderstood the meaning of unilateral withdrawal. Those of us who have supported unilateralism didn't expect a quiet border in return for our withdrawal but simply the creation of a border from which we could more vigorously defend ourselves, with greater domestic consensus and international understanding. The anticipated outcome, then, wasn't an illusory peace but a more effective way to fight the war. The question wasn't whether Hamas or Hezbollah would forswear aggression but whether Israel would act with appropriate vigor to their continued aggression.

So it wasn't the rocket attacks that were a blow to the unilateralist camp, but rather Israel's tepid responses to those attacks. If unilateralists made a mistake, it was in believing our political leaders--including Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert--when they promised a policy of zero tolerance against any attacks emanating from Gaza after Israel's withdrawal. That policy was not implemented--until two weeks ago. Now, belatedly, the Olmert government is trying to regain something of its lost credibility, and that is the real meaning of this initial phase of the war, both in Gaza and in Lebanon.

Still, many in Israel believe that, even now, the government is acting with excessive restraint. One centrist friend of mine, an Olmert voter, said to me, "If we had assassinated [Hamas leader] Haniyeh after the first kidnapping, [Hezbollah leader] Nasrallah would have thought twice about ordering another kidnapping." Israel, then, isn't paying for the failure of unilateral withdrawal, but for the failure to fulfill its promise to seriously respond to provocations after withdrawal...

I would argue that what we're watching is part of that promise, if a bit belated [the rest of the piece is in the private forum if you have trouble with the TNR site].

There's been too much going on to analyze in any sort of useful way without writing a book, but I did want to make a couple of (possibly) disjointed, reactionary comments.

First, this business of "proportionality" is starting to make my eyes cross. As I said in a comment at Seawitch's blog, anyone who starts yammering about “proportionality” in a war should immediately be written off as a fool or a charlatan. They are issuing prescriptions for others they would never in a million years imbibe themselves. When you go to war you go full-bore with overwhelming force or you do…not…go. Got that? If I never hear that hypocritical word again it'll be too soon.

Second, my heart truly goes out to those many Lebanese and other Arabs who would like nothing more than to get rid of Hizballah but feel powerless to do so. The fact that they are caught in the middle here is heartbreaking. Unfortunately, they live in a country that can't control its borders and can't control a member party of its government. So the Israelis have ruined tourist season by a blockade to prevent moving the kidnapped soldiers out of the country and, more probably, to prevent easy military resupply and put pressure on the Lebanese to do something. Letting Hizballah export war south while Lebanese sit comfortable in Beirut is no longer an option. If we hurt, you hurt. It's not nice, but that's war. (I think, btw, that the efficacy of this strategy is dubious, but that's another issue. I do understand it, however.)

It would be nice (not the right word, but you get the point) to see some direct action against the Syrian regime (no more flyovers without a delivery), as they also need to feel the pinch, which they should have felt long ago, for being Hamas's hosts. Action against Iran is a bigger nut to crack, and one that I don't want to tackle right now, but it looks like that's coming soon anyway, especially as they've said they'll fight if Syria is attacked. (Ignore threats of a general Jihad against Israel at Iran's command -- the rest of the Arab World will be content to say, "OK, you first" as they always do.) On the other hand, it could very well be that the Israelis have taken the measure of the Syrians and have decided they're nothing but chumps in all this. They're saving their punches for Iran.

Update: A very good indication that Iran is the man behind the curtain.

1 Comment

"First, this business of 'proportionality' is starting to make my eyes cross": Thank you. I needed a laugh today.

[an error occurred while processing this directive]

[an error occurred while processing this directive]

Search


Archives
[an error occurred while processing this directive] [an error occurred while processing this directive]