...The president, as commander in chief, has asserted his authority to use sophisticated military drones to search for Osama bin Laden, to deploy our armed forces in combat zones, and to kill or capture al Qaeda operatives around the world. No one would dispute that the AUMF supports the president in each of these actions.

It is, therefore, inconceivable that the AUMF does not also support the president's efforts to intercept the communications of our enemies. Any future al Qaeda attacks on the homeland are likely to be carried out, like Sept. 11, by operatives hiding among us. The NSA terrorist surveillance program is a military operation designed to detect them quickly. Efforts to identify the terrorists and their plans expeditiously while ensuring faithful adherence to the Constitution and our existing laws is precisely what America expects from the president.

History is clear that signals intelligence is, to use the language of the Supreme Court, "a fundamental incident of waging war." President Wilson authorized the military to intercept all telegraph, telephone and cable communications into and out of the U.S. during World War I. The day after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt authorized the interception of all communications traffic into and out of the U.S. These sweeping measures were seen as necessary and lawful during critical moments of past armed conflicts. So, too, are the more focused intercepts of al Qaeda during our current armed conflict, especially given the nature of the enemy we face...

... Some in Congress argue that the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is the sole operating authority for any secret eavesdropping. But under FISA, enacted back in the days of 8-track tapes and rotary phones, the procedure for getting a warrant isn't fast enough to catch terrorists using multiple throwaway cellphones and DSL Web connections. Even FISA's 72-hour "emergency bypass" requires a written opinion by NSA lawyers and certification from the attorney general before the intercept can be initiated.

Gen. Hayden and those familiar with the FISA process contend that it is simply too slow for the "hot pursuit" of terrorist communications.

Since even the most "outraged" members of Congress haven't actually called for the president to stop the eavesdropping program, one suspects that it is every bit as vital and effective as Gen. Hayden says it is. Those crying foul in the wake of the program's disclosure haven't offered a workable alternative, other than including more people on the briefing list or rewriting the law itself — which means fully disclosing a highly-classified program to 535 members of Congress and their staffs. Is there anyone in America who believes that 1,000 people on Capitol Hill can keep these operational details quiet?...