

UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE OF *JIHAD* IDEOLOGY:
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

April 2008

I dedicate this to all the children, who deserve a future free from fear, terror and baseless hatred....

“Tolerance of the intolerant is nothing but cowardice.” Aayan Hirsi Ali

Executive Summary

It has been almost seven years since the attacks of 9/11/2001 and more than twenty-five years since Hezbollah's bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. Yet the United States Government and its various law enforcement and intelligence communities still do not have a clear understanding of the threat from militant Islam or *jihad* , its ideological basis and its doctrine.

The policy the United States has adopted to counter this threat is still based on an incomplete understanding of the threat doctrine, the ideology that drives it, and the religious basis that *jihadists* use to validate their tactics. This lack of knowledge must be rectified in order to establish realistic policies to counter, defer, contain, and defeat the threat from radical *jihadists* .

This ignorance and neglect has led to the unimpeded growth within the United States of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the original modern *jihad* organization, and its many offshoots, fronts, and imitators, whose stated purpose is what the Brotherhood itself has called a "civilization-jihad" whose intention is to destroy Western civilization from within. Despite this threat, many intelligence analysts and policy-makers insist that we must "engage" the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies in order to influence their behavior in a positive direction.

An improved policy must be focused on education first and foremost. There must be an organized, concerted effort to educate the government and intelligence communities on the true nature of the threat posed by *jihad* organizations. A clearly understood and fully elaborated global threat model must be developed, through what might be compared to the Manhattan project: in this case, an all-out, concerted effort to develop, not a weapon, but a clear strategic comprehension of the threat and to develop a clear definition of the enemy.

From this clarity, policies can be developed to confront the activities of the MB in the United States. The Brotherhood must be exposed as a hostile strategic threat. It must be engaged in this realm only.

I.

“What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from the men who know the enemy.” Sun Tzu

*“However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into consideration.”
Sir Winston Churchill*

*“To see what is in front of one's nose needs a constant struggle.”
George Orwell*

Over the past number of years, the United States has confronted a growing threat from *jihadist* organizations posing daunting challenges for the Government and the intelligence community. History attests to America's ability to adapt to changing threats in the past, with America's military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities rising to meet the challenge. While the *jihadist* threat is not new, the attacks of September 11, 2001, provided America with immediate awareness of this threat. But America has yet to come to terms with the complexities and realities of the *jihadist* enemy. Because a common baseline understanding of the enemy and his doctrine is still lacking, America continues to grapple with how best to utilize its assets of national power to protect American lives and America's way of life. Political correctness has paralyzed the effective development of strategies to confront *jihad* terrorists while *jihadists* have been able to leverage their small numbers to force the mobilization and expenditure of vast resources for counterterrorism.

Created to meet the needs of the Cold War, the American intelligence community (IC) still reflects a Cold War mindset. In the Cold War, America dealt with a predictable threat that could be assessed in terms of an understood force structure—whether

measuring the number of aircraft in squadrons, ships in fleets, or vehicles and men in armored and infantry divisions. The published doctrines and asset deployment of our Cold War enemies were available for study. Then, the IC focused on sovereign countries with fixed borders and military assets, whose changes were observable and pegged to indicators that could provide warning of future intent. Hostile policies and actions were studied and scrutinized. The enemy and his doctrine were well-known.¹

Today's threat of global terrorism, however, confronts America with *jihadist* and *Dawa*² organizations operating outside sovereign terrain. Active throughout the real and virtual world, terrorist hierarchies do not lend themselves to neat organizational charts. *Jihadists* have no uniforms, standardized systems, military bases, or headquarters. These are groups whose members are motivated by doctrines with fixed, divinely ordained requirements. Religious ideology motivates *jihadists* to fight infidels zealously for the revival of the Muslim caliphate and the restoration of Islamic law, *sharia*. The IC has to adapt to deal with a determined foe not acting in accordance with the current array of predictive models or forms of behavior. *Jihadist* and *Dawa* groups are diverse and their methods vary.

Another challenge for the IC is the need to remain in a constant state of operational vigilance. While the Cold War adversary was available for intelligence study in the absence of direct conflict, offering the luxury of time to prepare intelligence assessments and analysis, today's groups of international terrorists can strike anywhere at anytime, and are in a constant state of war with America. Many entities are fighting the United States, even as the IC seeks to understand them. The threat is now permanent and

¹ Interview with IC analyst.

² *Dawa* is the invitation to non-Muslims to accept Islam, and is discussed more thoroughly below.

constant, but varies in its tactics: while driven by a common doctrine, *jihadists* develop and change their methods and tactics constantly.³

Because the enemy follows divinely mandated doctrines, his war has an indefinite timeline. The enemy's desired end state is the conversion or submission of the West to Islam. This avowed aim is often dismissed because of its sheer improbability, and so many analysts dismiss *jihad* ideology because of these unrealistic aims. These analysts often then insist that the stated aims are merely expressive of other, more practical goals (such as the reform of autocratic Arab regimes in the Middle East). Yet dedicated groups in pursuit of improbable ends may do incalculable damage, even if their ultimate goals are not achieved. Furthermore, because the Muslim world currently lacks a coherent central leadership, *jihadist* and *Dawa* groups will compete for power and leadership in a growing *jihad* movement, giving the illusion that the enemy is in disarray. But *jihad* groups, however much they may differ in other matters, nevertheless agree on the desired end-state, which is the conquest of the West and the submission of infidels to the one true religion.⁴

In past American wars, religion was not a defining factor. Today religion is at the forefront of motivations for every *jihad* terror group. This creates a new challenge based on a new reality for analysts with War on Terror (WOT) responsibility. This challenge, moreover, comes at a time when many elites in the West find it hard to believe that ancient notions of war based on religion can still motivate actors today.

³ Interview with IC analyst.

⁴ For a thorough description of the ideology and aims of the *jihadists*, see Walid Phares, *Future Jihad* (2005) and *The War of Ideas* (2007).

America denies itself a clear understanding of the enemy because it refuses to focus on the enemy's stated threat doctrine. This keeps the IC from developing a coherent understanding of the unifying doctrines that make otherwise diverse elements comprehensible. There was once a single adversary, the Soviet Union, supporting regional conflicts for its own interests. Then, the IC could deal with threats as they developed. The threat of global *jihād* demands knowledge of local conflicts throughout the world, and their connections: i.e., of all *jihād* and *Dawa* groups operating anywhere and everywhere. While there may be no centralized global *jihād* threat, localized *jihād* groups operate throughout the world in response to the same motivations. The United States has to deal with global threats, acquiring knowledge of the global doctrine as applied to regional variants. In the aftermath of 9/11, the IC also has to work cooperatively, sharing information in an unprecedented way.⁵

Collecting intelligence on this threat is unprecedented in its difficulty. While America has great technological advantages, it has difficulty observing this seemingly shadowy adversary. *Jihād* groups are aware of our technological capabilities and have shown great ingenuity in responding to technological methods of intelligence collection. Successful communication intercepts provide limited information, leaving more questions than answers.

Human intelligence is the best way to discover the intended actions of an adversary. A direct link to the personalities and ideas of an organization gives the best understanding of an enemy and offers the greatest opportunity to provide warning of future attacks. Gathering human intelligence against global *jihād* organizations is, however, fraught with problems. Penetration of religious cultures constructed along

⁵ Interview with IC analyst.

close familial and personal ties is nearly impossible. This means that the ability to procure human intelligence will remain minimal.⁶

In earlier conflicts, a great deal of information about the enemy was available from open sources such as the media, academia, and think tanks. Oddly, in the current conflict, the best sources of information, often available in English, are the doctrinal texts of *sharia* and *jihad*, most of them readily available in mosque-associated bookstores and on the internet. Yet, curiously, analysts choose not to incorporate these texts into their analytical models. Hence, the media and other institutions lack detailed information about the enemy, relying instead on often misleading popular accounts in the press. To the extent that information is available through conventional media channels, it is often distorted by bias, ignorance, conflict of interests, and personal agendas. This further convolutes the analytical products of analysts overwhelmed by problems they deny themselves the capacity to understand.⁷

While *jihadists* continuously plan to attack, it is not clear where or how, or what the capabilities of each group might be. Harmful intentions are known; but to what extent and by what means is not. Even if the threat emanates from a country such as Iran, ascertaining intent is difficult, for such societies are closed, with relatively small, discrete leadership circles. This was the case in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, which led to faulty assessments of Hussein's activities and plans.

⁶ Craig Whitlock, "After a Decade at War With West, Al-Qaeda Still Impervious to Spies," *Washington Post*, March 20, 2008.

⁷ Interview with IC analyst.

II.

“Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total.” Sun Tzu

Because the jihad threat is driven by a religious ideology, our first task as analysts is to reach an understanding of this ideology. But dealing with religion is constrained by strong inhibitions for both the IC and society in general. Criticizing or scrutinizing another’s religious beliefs causes discomfort, and in some circumstances is even taboo. Yet the *jihadist* adversary is essentially religious, deriving validity and credibility from the doctrinal teachings of Islamic law and in particular the law of *jihad*. Because the IC convinced itself that researching these teachings is anathema to Americans, they rejected the reality of the enemy’s self-identified religious and ideological motives. The IC, as well as academia and the media are reluctant to lend any credence to the stated Islamic motivations for *jihad*, believing that an ancient religious belief cannot possibly be relevant to understanding a contemporary threat. Fears of being politically incorrect, of appearing bigoted or offensive in any respect, have compromised the analytical processes associated with threat doctrine development, which have in the past maintained some level of fidelity to Sun Tzu’s maxim to know the enemy. This lack of fundamental study hinders understanding, but deficient understanding of the enemy reduces the chances of victory, even as the enemy relies on those same doctrines to fight, kill, and die in the cause of *jihad*.⁸

Analysis of the threat doctrine gives an understanding of what is important to the enemy. Here the enemy’s values and objectives present themselves for analysis and can be integrated into a larger cultural, political, and ethnic framework. Understanding

⁸ Interview with IC analyst.

demands a solid foundation, including common definitions outlining the threat doctrine, a tangible baseline for all analysts and policy makers. This still does not exist, more than six years after 9/11 and more than twenty-five years since the Marine barracks were bombed by Hezbollah in Beirut. The result is a mishmash of competing paradigms that operate at varying levels of understanding of the threat doctrine— all of which are filtered through wishful thinking that is often at variance with reality.

Jihad is a religious-based, expansionary, military-political ideology requiring adherents to expand Muslim influence throughout the world. It is an obligation to do everything to expand the influence and control of Islam by violence or persuasion, leaving the followers of *jihad* in a permanent state of conflict with the world. *Jihad* is hostile towards any entity not submitting to Islam's perceived superiority. Of course, not every Muslim adheres to the militant *jihadist* narrative, with many Muslims choosing to limit the meaning of *jihad* to their own internal spiritual struggles. These individuals are not America's enemy and their views on *jihad* do not constitute a basis for the threat doctrine. Unfortunately, militant *jihadists* can genuinely support their rationale by reference to currently existing Islamic law that more than validates their claims without having to rely on tortured interpretations. In the war of ideas in the Muslim world, the enemy has orthodoxy on his side, and this is a fact that the IC needs to understand.⁹

It is also important to note that there is no reason to think that the Muslim understanding of *jihad* is static: those who view *jihad* as an internal struggle may in the future change their mind; likewise, some few who follow the orthodox view of *jihad* as literal war may also change their mind (e.g., Tawfiq Hamid). Much will depend on how the West responds to *jihad* provocations: weakness on the part of the West, for example,

⁹ David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

may give "moderate" Muslims the idea that the violent *ihadists* are the wave of the future.¹⁰ Significantly, many Americans do not want to deal with *ihadists* because it is easier to believe that all people are inherently good, that all religious beliefs are basically the same, and that all religions have troublesome elements in their orthodox scriptures.

Ultimately, of course, it should not matter if America faces a religious war or not; it should not matter what the Koran says to the way that faith manifests itself with respect to *ihadist* ideologies. *Iihadists* are simply the enemy and must be engaged as such, whatever the source of their beliefs. Whether *ihadists* base their ideologies on religion or on some other motivation, timeless principles of warfare identify *ihadists* as enemies precisely because they declare their hostile intent and act accordingly. But understanding the nature of this threat means understanding that Islamic terrorists derive their passion for fighting from a faith that subordinates itself to a divine law requiring *ihad* until the world has been brought under the *dar al Islam* — i.e., the world under the control of Islam. Americans must see *ihad* as *ihadists* see it, whether *ihad* is an ideology based upon religion, or an ideology based upon power and greed. To accurately attack their will, it is necessary to understand the source of their will, namely a doctrinal reading of Islamic writings and the example of Muhammad's life and actions. Because *ihadists* clearly state that Islamic law provides the doctrinal basis for their actions, that law becomes by definition the enemy's threat doctrine, thus making it the mandatory object of analysis according to our own doctrine on threat development. Importantly, this

¹⁰ Tawfiq Hamid, "The Development of a Jihadi's mind," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2007).

remains true even if the *ihadists* could be proven wrong about their claims with regard to Islamic teachings.¹¹

As a starting point, the enemy is who he says he is and should be evaluated on that basis. The IC must make a concerted effort to study the threat in this regard and would be well advised to read books written by knowledgeable authorities such as, for example, Walid Phares's *Future Jihad*, or David Cooke's *Understanding Jihad*. It is, however, more important for analysts to graduate from third person accounts and go directly to the source. Understanding the enemy requires reading his sources with unconstrained perception of his values and objectives. Analysts should read direct source books such as Pakistani Brigadier Malik's book, *The Koranic Concept of War*; Sheikh Nu Ha Mim Keller's authoritative translation of sacred Islamic law, *The Reliance of the Traveler; Milestones*, by Sayyid Qutb; *The Methodology of Dawa in America*, by Shammim Siddiqi; and *The Al Qaeda Reader*, by Raymond Ibrahim.¹² Analysts also need to go directly to the Koran, specifically to the passages that the enemy expressly relies on to provide the doctrinal basis for their actions. Such passages include the following:

*Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not. **Koran 2:216***

*Soon shall We **cast terror into the hearts** of the Unbelievers. **Koran 3: 151***

¹¹ There is a rough analogy to the early days of the Cold War, when it was sometimes said that Soviet behavior had nothing to do with the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism.

¹² S. K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War* (Adam Publishers, 1992); Ahmad Ibn Lulu Ibn Al-Naqib, *Reliance of the Traveller: The Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law Umdat al-Salik*, translated by Noah Ha Mim Keller (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1994); Sayid Qutb, *Milestones* (Beirut: Holy Koran Publishing House, 1978); Shamim Siddiqi, *Methodology of Dawaha Ilallah in American Perspective* (New York: Forum for Islamic Work, 1989); Raymond Ibrahim, *The Al-Qaeda Reader* (New York: Doubleday, 2006).

*And those of the People of the Book who aided them, Allah did take them down from their strongholds and **cast terror into their hearts**, (so that some ye slew, and some ye made prisoners. And he made you heirs of their lands, their houses, and their goods, and of a land which ye had not frequented (before). And Allah has power over all things. **Koran 33: 26-27***

*Let not the unbelievers think that they can get the better (of the Godly): they will never frustrate them. Against them make ready your strength of the utmost of your power, including steeds of war **to strike terror into (the hearts of)** the enemies of Allah any your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know.” **Koran 8:56-60***

*I am with you: give firmness to the Believers: I will **instill terror into the hearts** of the unbelievers. **Koran 8: 12***

*Remember thy Lord inspired the angels with the message: “I am with you: give firmness to the Believers: I will instill terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers: **Smite ye above their necks** and smite all their finger tips off them.” **Koran 8:12***

*But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them and beleague them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war; but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them. **Koran 9:5***

Fight** those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Apostle, nor acknowledge the religion of truth, even if they are of the people of the Book, until they pay the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued. **Koran 9:29

The Koran’s message to Muslims in these passages is that it is pious behavior to wage war in the name of Allah against non-Muslims. Most of the more violent passages in the Koran, moreover, have greater standing in Islam than more peaceful passages because of the concept of *abrogation*. This concept states that verses revealed later in Muhammad’s life abrogate or replace earlier contradictory or variant verses. Thus the chronologically later violent verses cancel earlier peaceful passages. Because many in the IC have no

understanding of this principle, they cannot correctly interpret the enemy's intentions, actions, or even plainly stated objectives.¹³

As the Pakistani Brigadier states:

“TERROR struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means; it is an end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. TERROR is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him.” S.K Malik

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“Show him there is a road to safety, and so create in his mind the idea that there is an alternative to death. Then strike.”

Tu Mu, quoted in the *Art of War*, Sun Tzu

Another IC problem is the lack of understanding of the Islamic principles of *taqiyya*, *kitman*, and *slander*. These are principles of deception, disinformation, and the requirement not to speak against a fellow Muslim. *Muhammad said, "War is deceit."*¹⁴ *Taqiyya* and *kitman* are Koran-based concepts of dissimulation, including deception by omission, i.e., deliberately leaving out key points in order to mislead and confuse your enemy. Systematic lying and distortion are standard tactics for the *jihadists*. This allows for the sanction of two simultaneous messages, one delivered to the enemy or infidels and a different, parallel message sent to the Muslim world. A classic example of this was Yasser Arafat's practice of saying one thing in English about a desire for peace, while simultaneously issuing calls for *jihad* and violence to his constituency in Arabic.¹⁵

¹³ Cook, *Understanding Jihad*.

¹⁴ Bukhari 4:267 and 269

¹⁵ Interview with IC analyst.

Slander is also prohibited in the teachings of Muhammad. This means that a Muslim is forbidden to give information that may incriminate another Muslim or do any harm to him at all.

*“The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim. He does not betray him, lie to him, or hang back from coming to his aid.”*¹⁶

This can have profound implications for law enforcement and investigative professionals trying to work within Muslim communities. If an FBI agent performs outreach in the Islamic community, he will be engaged at whatever level of understanding he has. The Imam or leaders of the community may choose to reveal only a minimum of information so as to deceive or confuse the agent. Any lack of understanding or sophistication will serve to lower the agent's guard. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, engages in this tactic, discussing issues in ways pleasing to Western ears. The Brotherhood disavows violence to Westerners while praising and extolling the use of violence by *jihadists* when speaking with Muslim audiences. The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States has the clear goal of engaging in a systematic *jihad* and *dawa* against American civilization. They follow a well planned strategy of infiltration and indoctrination of America.

A definition of *dawa* from the *Encyclopedia of Islam* follows:

The *dawa*, in the religious sense is the invitation, addressed to men by Allah and the prophets, to believe in the true religion, Islam. The religion of all the prophets is Islam, and each prophet has his *dawa*, Muhammad's mission was to repeat the call and invitation: it is the *dawat al-Islām* or *dawat al-Rasūl*. The Infidels' familiarity with, or ignorance of, this appeal determined the way in which the Muslims should fight against them. Those to whom the *dawa* had not yet penetrated had to be invited to embrace Islam before fighting could take place...By a natural extension *dawa* also denotes the content of this appeal, the religious law, and the words *dawa*, *sunna*, *sharia*, *dīn*, are often used interchangeably.¹⁷

¹⁶ Al-Misri, *Umdat al-Salik*, Book R öHolding Ones Tongue,ö r2.3, r2.6 Slander (*Ghiba*) *Reliance of the Traveller*.

¹⁷ *Encyclopedia of Islam*, ed. H. A. R. Gibb et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1960).

This definition is consistent with the policy outlined by *The General Strategic Goal for the Group (Ikwān) in North America*, which was written in 1991 by members of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the United States. This document was entered into evidence during the discovery process in the terrorism financing case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. The document describes the aim of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States as follows:

The process of settlement [in America] is a **‘Civilization-Jihadist Process** with all that means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of **grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within**¹⁸

It should not surprise the West that its enemy should seek to mislead about his intentions, methods, and goals. Deliberate and systematic deception and disinformation must be considered standard *jihadist* tactics. These tactics need to be understood as the framework of an enemy who wants its opponents to relax, lower their defenses, and suffer defeat without a fight. The enemy will take a direct approach in the face of weakness and reverse his approach when he is at a disadvantage.

III.

“Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.”
- *Sun Tzu*

An adversary working under the veil of religion has distinct advantages when confronting modern controversy-averse societies. Political correctness, multiculturalism, and denial mindsets (especially the belief that religion cannot be important in comparison to economic or nationalist motives) undermine the West's ability to defend

¹⁸ Government Exhibit No. 003-0085 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

itself. The West is paralyzed by its unwillingness to understand the threat in a war of ideas. Like any problem, only a proper diagnosis can lead to a cure. There can be no security for the United States and the West until there is a willingness to face reality by confronting the seriousness and gravity of this enemy.

The *jihad* movement does not fit into accustomed threat models because other enemies sought tangible, limited objectives, such as land, power, control, or economic advantage. *Jihad*, by contrast, is a messianic, violent political ideology with no single government as an interlocutor. Thus the conventional approaches to dealing with an enemy do not apply. In this situation guidance will come from people who understand the threat doctrine of *jihad*, but this message will be uncomfortable and hard to internalize. The *jihadist* enemy is determined and willing to engage in horrible acts of violence to achieve its goals.

But since the threat comes from the enemy's religious ideology -- a doctrine supported by Islamic law -- the intelligence community prefers not to deal with the actual cause of the threat, for fear of giving offense to a vulnerable minority inside the United States. In this way the free world prevents itself from understanding its enemy. Part of the problem stems from a kind of wishful thinking, mistaken assumptions, and cognitive egocentrism. No one wants to think of a war with 1.4 billion people around the world and at home. It is preferable to think that the *jihadist* enemy is at least somewhat rational (like the Soviets), and that if dealt with as such, successful means to solve (or at least manage) the conflict will appear. Acknowledging that the foe is driven by a religious ideology of world conquest does not mean that 1.4 billion Muslims adhere to that ideology. However, pretending that the *jihadists* do not adhere to the religious ideology

of struggle, in order to avoid giving offense, seems like a strange way to proceed. The IC needs to recognize what it faces empirically, rather than work from denial driven by false assumptions. Without this understanding, America will be crippled by losing the information war.

The *jihadists* are determined to destroy America's free way of life. They will not be wished away or negotiated into any settlement. They will be ruthless in the pursuit of their objectives and, if empowered, they will intimidate or inspire Muslims who would not otherwise support them. Analysts must understand this. The IC will have to be direct in its assessments. The roots of this ideology must be confronted, its teaching of hate and intolerance exposed. This understanding will not come until the IC is fully able to accept the harsh realities of what *jihad* is and the will of the enemy who will use it.

IV.

“The opportunity to secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.” - Sun Tzu

Following this discussion of the broader danger of misunderstanding *jihad*, analysis now turns to the specific topic of the Muslim Brotherhood's behavior in the United States.

Muslim Brotherhood Coat of Arms



“Allah is our objective, the Prophet is our leader, the Qur'an is our law, jihad is our way, dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.” Motto: Muslim Brotherhood

The activities in the United States of the Muslim Brotherhood (or in Arabic, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, often simply known as the Brothers) are increasingly attracting attention.¹⁹ The MB has been deliberately and methodically building a network of organizations in its efforts to establish a permanent radical Muslim infrastructure in the United States and throughout the world. This has serious consequences for the United States in its attempts to quell the influence of *jihadist* organizations. Ambassador Hussain Haqqani of the Hudson Institute expressed his concern during a talk in October 2007:

í . many mosques and organizations in North America **are influenced or controlled by associates of the Muslim Brotherhood.** The American Muslim community as a whole is very diverse and includes Sufis, Shias, Sunnis, and people with backgrounds in syncretism. Although an overwhelming majority of American Muslims would prefer that their imams be American *and Muslim* rather than radical Muslims aiming to change the American way of life, **the Muslim Brotherhood has identified itself as their leaders, í the Muslim agenda in the U.S. has been defined by the Muslim Brotherhood.** Matters of religious interpretation and inter-faith dialogue have taken a back seat to the **Brotherhood's political issues and priorities.** Instead of accepting the diversity among Muslims who consider Islam simply as their religious faith, **Muslim Brotherhood leaders describe Islam as a political and social ideology. Islam is therefore defined as ideology and faith, and any distinctions between the two become blurred.**²⁰

The reality that the MB has almost a monopoly on the teachings of Islam and Islamism in the United States has serious implications. Zeyno Baran from Hudson has stressed:

í **the first step on the road to jihadi terrorism is instruction in Islamist ideology.** Nearly all individuals involved in terrorism—whether as a foot soldier executing the attack or an upper level mastermind, financier, or recruiter—start out as non-violent Salafi Islamists, and many were once Brotherhood members. For example, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the September 11 terrorist attacks, told US

¹⁹ For example see "Struggle for the Soul of Islam," by Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe, and Lauri Cohen, *Chicago Tribune*, September 19, 2004.

²⁰ Remarks at Muslim Brotherhood Conference, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., October 16, 2007.

interrogators that he was first drawn to violent jihad after attending Brotherhood youth camps.²¹

The stark reality of the MB's violent intent in the United States has become apparent as a result of the information released during the case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, in Dallas, Texas. The documents released gave a sobering view of MB goals, with one document clearly outlining the American development of the group in deliberate stages over the last 40 years. The MB seeks to influence and transform America in preparation for the ultimate destruction of the Constitution and its replacement with an Islamic Caliphate. The MB in the United States has the clear goal of engaging in a systematic *jihad* against American civilization as outlined by the 1991 document *The General Strategic Goal for the Group (Ikhwan) in North America*. The document was briefly quoted above, but the fuller quote below states with shocking bluntness that the

process of settlement is a '**Civilization-Jihadist Process**' with all that means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in **America** is a kind of **grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within** and sabotaging its miserable house *by their hands* and the hands of the believers so that it is **eliminated** and Allah's religion is made *victorious over all other religions*.¹ It is a Muslim's destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is.²²

It is hard to fathom that an organization with stated goals as direct as this has been allowed to develop unimpeded in the United States for over 40 years. After 9/11 the awareness that the West was facing threats from violent *jihadist* groups became more firmly established. But one of the major contributors to this ideology has somehow managed to fly under the radar of the public, government, and security apparatus.

²¹ Zeyno Baran, "The Muslim Brotherhood's U.S. Network," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol 6* (Washington, D.C.: The Hudson Institute, 2008).

²² Government Exhibit No. 003-0085 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

Dr. Hillel Fradkin of the Hudson Institute explained it this way:

[T]here is another, more accidental reason that the Brotherhood has escaped much scrutiny: it is not always operative under that name. This is somewhat true in the mostly Muslim world. It is emphatically true in other countries^ô in Western Europe and the United States, for example^ô with relatively large Muslim minority communities. In the United States the great **majority of prominent Muslim organizations were founded by members of the Brotherhood** from a variety of Muslim countries. Such organizations include the **Muslim Student Association**, the **Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)** and the **Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)**. But none of them expressly bear the name of the Brotherhood. The natural and cumulative effect of these circumstances has been to make us **al-Qaeda- and Wahhabi-centric** and to place the **Brotherhood in the shadows**. But this is, to repeat, deeply regrettable because there is no other organization more fundamental to understanding the Islamist movement of today. There is no other organization that can match the **Brotherhood's length of history, staying power and extent of influence**.²³

The MB's history is indeed long, beginning with its founding in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, an elementary school teacher who had studied in universities stressing Islamic fundamentalist teachings. Created as an Islamist organization devoted to establishing an Islamic state, the MB was both a political party and a social organization. Growing rapidly in virtually all sectors of society, the MB reached out to other Islamic movements throughout the Arab world from the outset, and helped build clandestine infrastructures to strengthen MB influence and advance its objectives. The MB has grown throughout the world to a collection of over seventy semiautonomous yet ideologically interconnected organizations. The movement is flexible enough to allow working under the *Ikhwan* name, under other names, or according to individual country circumstances.²⁴ MB ideology is based on Al-Banna's idea of a worldwide Islamic state governed under one authority by *sharia*. The contemporary Brothers are strongly

²³ Remarks 16 October 2007. Muslim Brotherhood Conference, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C.

²⁴ See the website of the Muslim Brotherhood at <http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/>.

influenced by the works of Sayyid Qutb, the author of *Milestones*, who in turn had shared the beliefs of earlier Islamist thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

These thinkers were obsessed with the idea that the ills of the Muslim world were caused by the failure to adhere strictly to Islamic law. This failure was blamed on the influence of corrupt governments set up by or in league with European colonial powers, who were blamed for the demise of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The Brothers wanted to emulate the life of Muhammad by working to enforce strict Islamic control throughout the Arab world and embark on armed jihad against the West, with the ultimate goal being the creation of a new caliphate to replace the caliphate destroyed by the Great War. The Brothers believe that they have an open-ended obligation to engage in this *jihad*. They have been working on this since the 1920s and do not feel hindered by any constraints of time or geography, with *jihad* being carried out anywhere in the world.

Because of this long time horizon the subscribers to this ideology have developed a long-term plan for *dawa* and *jihad* involving a staged system of education, indoctrination, socialization, and Islamization of Muslim communities. The Brothers have been working on this systematic approach since their inception, slowly building momentum. Shamin Siddiqi's *Methodology of Dawaha Ilallah in American Perspective* is a good example of how the Brothers pace the education, indoctrination, and transformation of individual and community from the bottom up. The Brothers teach the rejection of anything not Muslim and the disdain of any Western values such as democracy, pluralism, tolerance, or secularization. The MB seeks separation of Muslim

communities by teaching hatred and sedition. The only source of law or way of life comes from *sharia* and the Koran.²⁵ MB philosophy appears in the MB motto: *“Allah is our objective, the Prophet is our leader, the Qur’an is our law, jihad is our way, dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”*

Leaders and regimes targeted for destruction by the *Ikwan* did not greet the Brothers with enthusiasm. *Ikwan* countries of origin became inhospitable for operations, with many Brothers being jailed, killed, or expelled. Some found refuge in Saudi Arabia (considered for a long time by the MB to be the most Islamic of the Arab regimes) while others left for Europe and the United States, where they were able to operate freely and to continue to develop the *Ikwan* network. Because the Saudis were aligned ideologically with the Brothers, partnerships developed in the 1960s and 1970s to use Saudi wealth to spread the MB’s hateful ideology globally. It was during these years that efforts were combined to establish Saudi charities, including the Muslim World League (MWL) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). Affiliates of these groups would be implicated in funding terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda.²⁶

Many violent jihadist organizations and individuals came out of Muslim Brotherhood ranks. Notable names and organizations like Hamas (founded in 1987 by the Brotherhood) demonstrate the significance of *Ikwan* ideology. The blind Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, now in prison for life for planning terrorist attacks in the United States, came from the Brotherhood, as did the founder of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Ayman Zawahiri, now Osama Bin Laden’s deputy. A co-founder of Al-Qaeda, Abdullah Azzam, and also Sudanese leader Hassan al-Turabi, who assisted Bin Laden during his time in

²⁵ Interview Zeyno Baran, The Hudson Institute. March 2008

²⁶ John Mintz and Douglas Farah, “In Search of Friends Among the Foes,” *The Washington Post*, September 11, 2004, p. A1.

Sudan, have *Ikwan* ties.²⁷ The *9/11 Report* quotes Khalid Sheik Mohammed stating that he was motivated to violent *jihad* by the *Ikwan* after participating in its youth training camps at the age of 16.²⁸ The leader of the Madrid train station bombing of March 11, 2004, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, and the others were identified as members of the *Ikwan*.²⁹

Documents from the Holy Land Foundation trial explain in the MB's own words the historical progression and development of activities in the United States.³⁰ These documents show the formation of the Brotherhood in the United States during the 1960s, after an immigrant influx of *Ikwan* members who wanted to spread Brotherhood's ideology to America. MB activities revolved around campuses, in particular the Muslim Students Association formed in 1963.³¹ The MB went through growing pains as it tried to build itself and establish agendas. In the documents there are many entries by a leader in the Brotherhood, Zeid al-Norman.³² The documents show how the organization began to grow, set objectives, and adapt to situations as they appeared. The MB laid out plans in five-year stages of codification, activism, and general work. From 1975 to 1980, the Brothers were laying the groundwork and building relationships with the Brotherhood members and all the while stressing the need for secrecy.

During the same time, the Ikhwan's **foreign connections became strong and that was due to the fundraising campaigns** which were launched by the Ikhwan which made it possible for the Ikhwan in the leadership to meet (the) leadership from the Orient. Therefore, membership here of the

²⁷ Mintz and Farah, op cit; Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "Jihad's Long Reach," *Newsweek*, Sept. 17, 2003; Farah, op cit., pp 145-157.

²⁸ *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Norton, 2004), pp. 145-46.

²⁹ Ministracion de Justicia, Juzgado Central de Instruccion No. 005, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario)0000035/2001 E.

³⁰ See for example <http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges/notable2.html#hlf>.

³¹ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation*, et al., p. 2.

³² Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation*, Government Exhibit 003-0003; 3:04-CR-240-G.

brothers who were members in their countries was **easier....** Those people come to the Movement and found some organizational practices such as means and priorities which were different from the ones they were accustomed to in their countries. So, they started to inquire, "Where is the strictness in the conditions? And where are these conditions? **Where is the secrecy**, where is (the) organizational connection and where are the educational programs? What are the goals of the Group here? What are the goals of these programs? All of these questions were resurfacing on the field anew. Therefore, **regional organizational pockets started to form** during this time period. Also, rumors and suspicions started to circulate among the ranks of the Group regarding individuals in the leadership. So, the Movement's then-current situation exploded during the camp of 1977 and a new leadership came on board in 1978 whose work was bitter as it was trying to purge the Group's body from regional restrictions and gatherings of from the organizational pockets and **tied its parts together** but, during this time period, it was a non-harmonious leadership and going back and forth was evident in its positions.³³

The Brotherhood continued to grow and adapt, all the while becoming more structured and centralized in leadership while the MB was branching off into interconnected organizations.

The elections of 1979 came along and the Shura Council came in 1980 and 1981 and the road in front of it was paved and the Shura Council came in 1980 and 1981 and the road in front of it was paved **and work began to unify the Group's ranks**, codification of work and pushing the **Movement's forward**. For the first time then, we had a General Masul who was dedicated to the Group's affairs alone and also the Shura Council started to play its true role which is planning and monitoring the executive leadership. The executive leadership was carrying its tasks through a Shura atmosphere and continuous contacts. Its **meetings were held consistently on a monthly basis**.

In 1980, the **Muslim Students Union** was developed into the **Islamic Society in North America (ISNA)** to include all the Muslim congregations **from immigrants and citizens**, and **to be a nucleus for the Islamic Movement in North America**! The ISNA has developed significantly in the 80s.³⁴

³³ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

³⁴ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*; Government Exhibit 003-0003; 3:04-CR-240-G.

In the five year plan from 1980 to 1985 the Brothers focused on the structure and settlement of the *Ikhwanø Dawaw'a*. They were trying to grow their influence and permanence, building a foundation for the Brothers already here to pave the way for more immigrants to follow.

By '**Settlement of the Dawaw'a**', the **Muslim Brotherhood Dawaw'a is meant**. It is not meant to spread Islam as spread of Islam is a general thing and it is indeed a goal for each Muslim in general terms. The second thing is the **settlement of the Dawaw'a and finding permanent fundamentals in the cities where Ikhwan now live** in order for them to be the **meeting points for the coming brothers** In 1985, the Youths Organization in North America was founded as an independent organization but **with a relationship with the ISNA**. Its work is centered on the children of the Muslim congregations **from immigrants and citizens in North America**. It has a general annual conference and regional conferences **across the continent**.³⁵

Continued reading through MB documents makes its deception and sedition more apparent. The MB started another phase with the objective to set up front groups and initiate substantial clandestine military and security programs.

[Fronts groups are] one method to communicate the Ikhwan's point of view. A front is not formed until after a study and after an exhaustive study. I mean, the last front formed by the Group is the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP). So, Ikhwan, this did not come out over night, or it was not the Ikhwan who are in charge went to sleep, dreamed about it and met the next day and decided to do it. Not at all, by God. This went through lengthy meetings and took long discussions.

In 1981, the Ikhwan founded the Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP) to serve the cause of Palestine on the political and the media fronts. The Association has absorbed most of the Ikhwanø Palestinian energy at the leadership and the grassroots levels in addition to some of the brothers from the other countries. Attention was given to the Arab new arrivals, immigrants and citizens in general, while focusing on the Palestinians in particular. The Associationø work had developed a great deal since its inception, particularly with the formation of the Palestine Committee, the beginning of the Intifada at the end of 1987 and the proclamation of the Hamas movement. **The Association has organizations affiliated with it**

³⁵ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

such as (The United Association for Studies & Research, The Occupied Land Fund and The Media Office), dedicated main personnel, several periodicals, research, studies and field branches in all the regions.³⁶

Strengthening the internal structure, administrative discipline, **recruitment and settlement of the Dawa'a**, energizing the organizations' work, energizing the **political work fronts**. As for the secondary goals, they are eight: first, financing and investment; second, foreign relations; third reviving women's activity; four, **political awareness** to members of the Group; five, **securing the Group**; six, **special activity**; seven, media; eight, benefiting from human potentials.³⁷

As can be seen from above, the *Ikwan* was not developing in any normal fashion as a charity or religious group, but as an ideologically driven group with devious agendas. The effort to set up clandestine security activities is a negative indicator. Military and counter surveillance capacities were being integrated into the Brotherhood's agenda.

'Special work' means military work. "Securing the Group's security, the Group's security against outside dangers. For instance, to monitor suspicious movement (í) which exist on the American front such as Zionism, Masonry etc. **Monitoring the suspicious movements or the sides, the government bodies such as the CIA, FBI etc,** so that we can find out if they are monitoring us, are we not being monitored, **how can we get rid of them.**"³⁸

This document later clarifies MB weapons training in the United States: "[I]t is not possible to have military training in Jordan, for instance, **while here in America there is (sic) weapons training in many of the Ikhwan camps** .ö This document goes on to discuss where the Brothers could go to train without scrutiny and troublesome

³⁶ Government Exhibit 003-0003; 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

³⁷ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

³⁸ Ibid.

ID verification. Certain states were identified as more favorable for military training than others.³⁹

In 1987 Hamas formed as an offshoot of the *Ikwan*. Direct links between the *Ikwan* and Hamas and their use of violence and terrorism are indisputable. Article 2 of the Hamas Charter states:

The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is **one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood** in Palestine. **The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement of modern times.** It is characterized by its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and judgment ,the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam.

In a 1992 (IAP) Islamic Association of Palestine document adds to the evidence:

í This Movementô which was bred in the bosom of the mother movement, **“The Muslim Brotherhood”ô** restored hope and life to the Muslim nation and the notion **that the flare of Jihad** has not died out and that the **banner of Islamic Jihad** is still raised.⁴⁰

The Brotherhood kept growing and branching out. After a meeting in 1993 in which the *Ikwan* and Hamas leaders decided to work on a more systematic propaganda agenda, the result was the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) founded in 1994. Its mission statement sought ôto enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.ö This sounds wonderful, but is not the true intent of the organization. The reality is that this is another organization within the Brotherhood running a deception campaign. The Brothersø real objectives are to use

³⁹ Ibid. I am grateful to Douglas Farah and Ron Sandee for their research on the Holy Land Foundation trial documents, and their recommendations as to which of the documents were most important.

⁴⁰ Government Exhibit 003-0015; 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

CAIR as an instrument to influence the United States by mounting a public relations campaign under the guise of a civil rights campaign. The Brothers know how to use words and issues in ways that Americans want to hear.⁴¹ In one of the documents there is reference to a dictionary of terms that will placate the American public.

CAIR has been engaging in a deception campaign in the United States targeting both government and non-government organizations (NGOs), the media, and particularly academic institutions. CAIR's leaders understand that the use of the media is "stronger than politics." Their training always stresses the need to present views that are acceptable and comfortable to Americans and "the need for infiltrating the American media outlets, universities and research centers."⁴²

As Zeyno Baran has argued, the Muslim Brotherhood establishes these organizations under false pretenses and teaches the art of deception. However, since the 1990s (especially after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing), the Brotherhood has become increasingly cautious. At a secret 1993 meeting of Hamas members and sympathizers in Philadelphia, Shukri Abu Baker, the Holy Land Foundation's former chief executive, stated "war is deception" and urged that "caution should be practiced not to reveal our true identity." Also present at this meeting was CAIR founder Omar Ahmad, who agreed with Abu Baker's comments that "war is deception" and added that "this is like one who plays basketball; he makes a player believe that he is doing this while he does something else" politics is a completion of war." Many CAIR members keep articulating their true intent by the statements made during meetings of the group

⁴¹ Interview with Zeyno Baran, February 2008.

⁴² Ibid.

and also out in public. For years the members and leadership of the *Ikwan* and related organizations have made similarly seditious comments.

Before the founding of CAIR, Ihsan Bagby who was on the board at its creation, said in 1980 that "ultimately Muslims can never be full citizens of this country, because there is no way we can be fully committed to the institutions and ideologies of this country." Another example is a comment by the American imam Zaid Shakir, who said in 2006 that "every Muslim who is honest would say: I would like to see America become a Muslim country." A similar idea was expressed by the chairman of CAIR, Omar Ahmed, as reported by a California newspaper in 1998. The newspaper story quoted Ahmed saying that Muslims should not assimilate into American society but should instead embark on *Dawa* and spread Islam. He stressed that Islam is not in America to be equal to any other faiths, but to become dominant, and that the Koran should be the highest authority in America while Islam would be the only accepted religion on Earth.⁴³

Another example is from one of the most prominent faces of CAIR, Ibrahim (Cary) Hooper. While always trying to put out a positive spin in the media, he has stated that he would like to overthrow the United States Government, albeit peacefully, and replace it with an Islamic state.⁴⁴

I wouldn't want to create the impression that I wouldn't like the government of the United States to be Islamic sometime in the future. But I'm not going to do anything violent to promote that. I'm going to do it through education (*Dawa*).⁴⁵

⁴³ Interview with Zeyno Baran, February 2008.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Minneapolis Star Tribune article 1993

This statement recalls the sentiments and strategies in the 1991 Brotherhood document, *The General Strategic Goal for the Group (Ikwan) in North America*, which was quoted extensively on p. 21 above. Subversion through Dawa is entirely consistent with the goals outlined by the Muslim Brotherhood in its 1991 statement.

The striking evidence of the *Ikwan's* long-term strategy and goals for its Dawa campaign comes through very clearly in all of the documents entered into evidence at the Holy Land Foundation trial, and in particular the *General Strategic Goal*.⁴⁶ Recall that statement's clear message: "the process of settlement is a "Civilization-Jihadist Process" with all that means." The *Ikwan's* purpose in America is "a kind of grand Jihad It is a Muslim's destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is."⁴⁷ This message clearly carries the authority of the leadership of the *Ikwan* in the United States, and it also illustrates the status of the Muslim Brotherhood as the leader of all Muslim organizations in North America. The 1991 statement continues:

In order for Islam and its Movement to become "a part of the homeland" in which it lives, "stable" in its land, "rooted" in the spirits and minds of its people, "enabled" in the life of its society and has firmly established "organizations" on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved, **the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain "the keys" and the tools of this process in carrying out this grand mission as a "Civilization Jihadist" responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslims and "on top of them—the Muslim Brotherhood in this country."**⁴⁸

The strategic goal of the Brotherhood is thus to destroy America from within through a civilizational *jihad*. This is not at all a peaceful statement; rather it is a call for *jihad* seeking to promote separation, sedition, and hatred.

⁴⁶ It is important to note here that all these documents from the Holy Land Foundation trial met the evidentiary standards for admission as evidence in a federal court, and that there were no objections concerning the authenticity and veracity of any of these documents by the defense.

⁴⁷ Government Exhibit No. 003-0085 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

⁴⁸ Government Exhibit 003-0085; 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

The *Strategic Goals* document also links the success of the *Ikhwan* in the United States to the success of the global Islamic movement in establishing a global caliphate. (Significantly, this is an idea now being pushed by al-Qaeda.) Then the Brothers discuss how to build coalitions and work systematically toward their desired end state. Knowing that they are not able to achieve their goals all at once, the Brothers are biding their time and building their strength until they are in a more advantageous position.

As part of the process is [the] conviction **that the success of the settlement of Islam and its Movement in this country [America] is a success to the global Islamic Movement and true support for the sought after state [caliphate]** God willing. As for the **role of the Ikhwan**, it is the initiative, pioneering, leadership, raising the banner and pushing people in that direction. They are then to work to employ, direct and unify Muslims' efforts and powers for this process. In order to do that, we must possess a mastery of the art of **"coalitions"**, the art of **"absorption"** and the principles of **"cooperation"**. We need to adopt the principle which says, "Take from people the best they have", their best specializations, experiences, arts, energies and abilities. By people here we mean those within or without the ranks of individuals and organizations. To me, there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work. And the U.S. Islamic arena is full of those waiting, the **pioneers.**⁴⁹

As demonstrated, the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States has been carrying out a systematic *jihad*. The Brothers have been building an interconnected infrastructure of over 29 groups using disinformation, dissimulation and deception.⁵⁰ It is apparent from these documents that the actions undertaken by the Brothers are not consistent with their publicly stated goals. Their security and counter surveillance activities paired with their weapons training clearly show that the MB is not a harmless civil rights

⁴⁹ Government Exhibit 003-0085; 3:04-CR-240-G; *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

⁵⁰ The list of organizations can be found in *Ibid.*

organization. Indoctrination of Islamism and *jihad* are spreading a violent ideology throughout the United States that can have only tragic consequences.

The mere presence of the MB in the United States has serious implications, presenting a latent insurgency that will provide a breeding ground for potential violence in the future. As Zeyno Baran stated, **“the first step on the road to *jihadi* terrorism is instruction in Islamist ideology.”** The Muslim Brotherhood has been successful so far. But it is obvious that the United States cannot allow active *jihad* terror groups, such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, to have access to an ever-growing group of young Muslims indoctrinated in Islamist ideology. Zeyno Baran frames the issue here:

The Islamist threat is real and is the result of decades of networking, infrastructure-building, and intellectual and ideological preparation. Within America, the key threat is not an eventual Islamist takeover of the country, but an Islamist takeover of its Muslim citizens. If American Muslims start forming “parallel societies,” it will be much easier for the Ikhwan to push for the introduction of sharia in these societies. While this may seem far-fetched, it cannot be so easily dismissed—especially given how close the Islamists came to introducing sharia for Canadian Muslims. And since most of the American Muslim organizations are in the hands of Islamists who enjoy seemingly unlimited money, media attention, and political influence, few non-Islamists would be able to fight back.⁵¹

The question is how to take the mantle of leadership from the *Ikhwan* and allow the Muslim community in the United States to develop away from the shadow of this hateful ideology.

The question of handling this issue remains open. The first step is to establish an accurate understanding of the problem. But as discussed in the first half of this paper, an accurate, common understanding of the threat from *jihad* and Islamism is lacking at all levels of the government. The United States Government must educate itself in order to

⁵¹ Zeyno Baran, “Network,” 2008, op. cit.

have a strategic comprehension of the latent terrorist and insurgent threat resident here in America, and this threat's links to global *jihadist* organizations. Lawmakers along with intelligence and law enforcement officials must begin with an education in threat ideology, without which no viable solution to the jihad problem is possible. It is impossible to overemphasize the fact that second and third party materials are never as valuable as primary sources. Comprehension of the vast array of open source material available on jihadists and Islamists is critical. The vast array of documents from just the Holy Land trial alone is shocking, but is even more illuminating when read with an awareness of and education in jihad doctrine.

V.

“*The easiest way for evil to succeed is for good men to do nothing.*” Edmund Burke

Currently, the Muslim Brotherhood has a relatively free reign in the United States, with no single coordinated policy addressing the problem that the Brotherhood represents. Current debate over the MB focuses on whether to engage the organization as a way of empowering more moderate elements in the Muslim community. This premise is based on the assumption that the *Ikwan* is not violent and that it will be a counterweight to organizations actively engaging in violence or plotting terror attacks such as al-Qaeda. Zeyno Baran finds this approach problematic:

This lesser-of-two-evils strategy is reminiscent of the rationale behind the Cold War-era decision to support the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet army. In the short term, the US alliance with the mujahideen did indeed aid America in its struggle against the Soviet Union. In the long term, however, US support led to the empowerment of a dangerous and potent adversary. In choosing its allies, the US cannot afford to elevate short-term tactical considerations above longer-term strategic ones. Most

importantly, the US must consider the ideology of any potential partners. Although various Islamist groups do quarrel over tactics and often bear considerable animosity towards one another, they all agree on the endgame: a world dictated by political Islam. A "divide and conquer" strategy by the United States will only push them closer together.

This idea of outreach to the MB is flawed in that it assumes that the various Islamist groups have different objectives. But in the case of the *Ikwan* and Al-Qaeda, shared goals and objectives exist alongside differing tactics. Al-Qaeda groups are more direct and aggressive, using violent jihad in the present to attack Western economies while confronting and eliminating any Western presence in Muslim countries. The *Ikwan* actively confront the West in the Islamic world with *jihad* terror as well, but the Brotherhood is also slowly and methodically building its strength and its network inside the West, to destroy it from within. The Muslim Brotherhood views al-Qaeda tactics as an impediment to their objectives, feeling that *jihadist* violence will attract attention to Brotherhood activities and hamper their progress. There is, however, no distinction between the MB and al-Qaeda concerning the desired end state of placing the entire world under an Islamic caliphate. In fact, as referenced elsewhere in this paper, al-Qaeda ultimately owes its existence to the inspiration of *Ikwan* ideologues such as the Egyptian jihadist intellectual Sayyid Qutb.

Proponents of outreach to the MB do not understand its nature in the United States, failing to understand in particular the concepts of *taqiyya* (deception) and *kitman* (disinformation).⁵² The proponents of engagement do not understand that the *Ikwan* tells the non-Muslim audience what it wants to hear, while displaying another face to Muslim

⁵² See for example the highly publicized study by fellows at the Nixon Center: "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," by Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2007, pp. 107-121.

audiences. The ðengagersö thus confuse signs of tactical cooperation with friendly intent.

Zeyno Baran explains this well:

The hardline Islamists and even the terrorists of today and tomorrow are smart, tech-and-media-savvy citizens of the West. Terrorist acts inside the US are huge setbacks for American Islamists; their long-term strategy of gradual infiltration was in fact seriously hurt by the 9/11 attacks as they increasingly came under the scrutiny of law enforcement authorities. It is not surprising that most of these organizations offer their cooperation to prevent Islamist terrorism inside the US. This is also the primary reason why some in the US favor engaging the Islamists. í , this is a misguided policy, as ideological extremism is at the root of the terrorist problem. The New York Police Department explicitly stated this link in its recent report on homegrown terrorist threats, stating that ðjihadi-Salafi ideology is the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out ðautonomous jihadø via acts of terrorism against their host countries.⁵³

The preponderance of evidence clearly shows that the *Ikwan* is involved in terrorism in the United States and abroad. The Muslim Brotherhood is involved in the spreading of an ideology providing Islamic justification for terrorist acts, including suicide bombings and attacks against American and coalition forces throughout the world. MB core ideology is at the very center of Islamist terror. The tactics of the Brothers may be presently nonviolent in the West, but they are propagating hatred and sedition in the countries where the MB operates. Their objectives directly challenge the West's democratic systems and values of tolerance and pluralism. Without common interests, cooperation with the MB makes little sense and is tantamount to suicide given that the MB sees its principal enemy in the United States.

“There is no safety for honest men except by believing all possible evil of evil men.”
Edmund Burke

⁵³ Zeyno Baran, op. cit., 2008.

Some analysts I will call them here the “non-engagers” have quietly advocated the designation of the International Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization on the Treasury Department’s list of Specially Designated Terrorist Organizations. The non-engagers’ argument is consistent with the facts revealed during the Holy Land Foundation trial, namely that the *Ikwan* has been working in the United States and the West since the 1930s in a slow buildup to advance the MB goal of replacing democratic constitutions with an Islamic Caliphate. Thus the MB and their members are hostile in ideology and seditious in actions. Those who designate the MB a terrorist organization further argue that members of the Brotherhood have gone on to create or join violent *jihadist* organizations waging active war on the United States and the West. The result of doing nothing allows the *Ikwan* to recruit and indoctrinate while being the center of the firestorm aimed against the Free World. The evidence clearly counters the myth of the *Ikwan* as a benign organization. However support for the “non-engagement” option is limited at this stage. The success of the *Ikwan*—its deceptive self-presentation—precludes the ability to designate the MB as a terrorist organization, at least at this time.

VI.

“With reasonable men I will reason, with humane men I will plead, with tyrants I will show no mercy.” Thomas Jefferson

The question remains of what to do against the Muslim Brotherhood’s asymmetric and illusive threat. Education is paramount. No policy option will succeed without all elements of the government, and for that matter the public, being fully aware of everything articulated thus far. There needs to be an honest discussion of what the

threat really is and what the MB is really saying in its own words, especially what the Brothers say to themselves. The reality is that the *jihadists* have and will continue to use jihad doctrine to their advantage. *Jihad* can be neither avoided nor appeased.

Engaging the MB without exposing their deceit is clearly a mistake. From the outside the MB appears to be benign, and it tells free people what they want to hear. But from the inside the MB promotes separation, hatred, and sedition. Non-engagement, however, would show the MB as it really is, exposing the truth that the Brothers are not here to assimilate into America but rather to assimilate America into the caliphate. The MB has, in reality, a platform not of civil liberties, but of promoting *sharia*. Theirs, however, is an effective approach so far. CAIR and the other organizations connected to the MB and the ideology of *jihad* have been quite successful in building a positive image throughout America, with access to every level of government, academia, and society. To limit this access is to limit MB power. And to limit MB power is to limit the ability of the MB to influence and intimidate their neighbors in the Muslim community, both Muslim individuals and Muslim organizations.

A government committee consisting of experts on the *Ikwan* should be formed, with the list of interviewees below being a good place to start. This committee must identify and scrutinize anyone allowed access to the government or the military. Full transparency concerning the identity of individuals and groups and their intentions must be established and enforced. Pushing the õbad guysö aside will make room for the õgood guysö i.e., those Muslims who wish to live in peace with their American neighbors and who are not interested in waging a war against õinfidels.ö But the Brothers already have over 600 chapters of the Muslim Students Association throughout the United States.

There are over 30 affiliate organizations related to the Brotherhood and acting on their ideology. In contrast, there are but a handful of alternative Muslim organizations active today, poorly staffed and with limited financial resources—e.g. the American Islamic Forum on Democracy (AIFD), or the American Islamic Congress (AIC). Because the Brotherhood has created the impression that it represents the entire Muslim community, other groups have been marginalized to the point of ineffectiveness. This suggests a frightening future for Muslim communities, with a MSA presence on the majority of campuses throughout America spreading the hateful ideology of the *Ikwan*.

The significance of this matter must be clear. The Islamic threat is real. The United States is not far behind the current situation of Great Britain where hundreds of networks indoctrinate thousands in Islamism. The homegrown terror threat is rising as well as its global connectivity to *jihadist* organizations. Yet some argue that the *jihad* organizations are weak, and the very extravagance of their ideology—replacing the Constitution with the Koran—makes many dismiss the threat as fanciful. But even a fanciful enemy can cause enormous damage, as we saw on 9/11, and as we saw in London, Madrid, and Bali, among many other places. What happens to a country when its government fails to defend its citizens against the kind of violence caused by the *jihad* network? Lack of confidence in the government will have negative ramifications for the American way of life. This is a gathering storm that must be confronted, contained, and reversed. American strength, America's only solution, is in American values and in the American way of life. Martin Luther King once said that the true test of a man is not where he stands in times of comfort and convenience but where he stands in times of adversity. Americans must stand up and confront Islamist intolerance.

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Interviews

Zeyno Baran from the Hudson Institute

David Cook from Rice University

Eric Brown from the Hudson Institute

M. Zuhdi Jasser, MD from American Islamic Forum for Democracy

Lorenzo Vidino Fletcher/ Tufts University

Douglas Farah from NEFA Foundation

Ron Sandee from NEFA Foundation

Josh Lefkowitz from NEFA Foundation

Zainab Al-Suwaij from the American Islamic Congress

Mark M. Lowenthal, Ph.D. Intelligence & Security Academy

Walid Phares from the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

Matthew Levitt from the Washington Institute

Sheikh Dr. Ahmed Subhy Mansour from the International Quranic Center

Jim Phillips from the Heritage Foundation

Shmuel Bar from the Hudson Institute

Analysts from the Joint Staff, DIA & FBI

Internet Resources:

<http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges/notable2.html#hlf>

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